What is a confused version of (1) or a confused version of (2) or, if it is not blurred, signals the commitment to Meinongianism, that is, the thesis that there are things/facts that do not exist. The temptation to (3) comes from the desire to offer more than a purely negative lie correspondence, while avoiding the obligation not to maintain oneself. Moore temporarily succumbs to the temptations of (3) (1910-11, pp. 267-269), but see p. 277). It is also found in Wittgenstein`s translation (1921, 4.25) of 1961, which refers by “facts” to (atomic) facts. In translation, Wittgenstein says that a fundamental statement is false if the relevant facts (atomic fact) do not exist – but the German original of the same passage looks more like a version of (2). Ironically, a definition of form (3) Plato`s lie problem reintroduces a theory of correspondence based on facts, i.e. a theory of gender that should offer an alternative solution to this problem (see section 1.2). However, there are other uses of terminology related to objectivity. Many philosophers use the term “subjective knowledge” to refer only to the knowledge of their own subjective states. Such knowledge differs from knowledge of the subjective states of another individual and knowledge of objective reality, both of which would be objective knowledge according to current definitions.
Your knowledge of another person`s subjective states can be called objective knowledge, as it is probably a part of the world that is for you “object”, as you and your subjective states are part of the world that is “object” for the other person. What: In some cases of knowledge of the outside world, we know the existence of something outside our mind. For example, when you saw the water well, you knew that a carmine red thing, it is a thing with the strength to create a certain sensation in you, existed. The last and fourth simultaneous reason offered by Locke is very familiar. According to Locke, our senses tend to confirm and support each other. We can touch what we see to verify that what we see really exists. This type of thinking alone is also not decisive against a skeptic. After all, a malicious demon could arrange the same kind of consistency. However, this type of vision can be seen as a simultaneous reason for our sensitive knowledge, because the mutual support of our senses is a point that can be part of a larger case for the benefit of the existence of an outside world. Perhaps the best explanation – if not the only possible explanation – for both our passivity and the coherence of our feelings is that an outside world is the cause. The following points could be made to privilege (2) over (1): (a) form (2) does not mean that things outside the category of truth bearers (paintings, dogs) are false simply because they do not correspond to facts.
One might think that this “error” of (1) is easy to fix: it is enough to explicitly specify the desired category of truth bearers on both sides of (1). Some fear, however, that categories of truthful, for example.B. declarative sentences or phrases that cannot be defined without invoking truth and evil, which would implicitly make the resulting definition circulating. (b) Form (2) allows objects in the category of truth bearers that are neither true nor false, that is, it allows the failure of bivalence. Some, but not all, will consider this to be a considerable advantage. (c) If the main vectors of truth are sentences or mental states, then the states could be their meanings or content, and the correspondence relationship in (2) could be understood accordingly as the relationship between representation, meaning, meaning or have as content. On the other hand, facts cannot be identified with the meanings or contents of sentences or mental states, in the pain of the absurd consequence that false phrases and beliefs have no meaning or content. . . .